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State Sponsorship and Support of
International Terrorism: Customary
Norms of State Responsibility
BY ScoT M. MALZAHN*
Preamble
At its first plenary meeting of the year, on September 12, 2001,
the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 56/1
without a vote:
The General Assembly, [g]uided by the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations... urgently calls for
international cooperation to prevent and eradicate acts of
terrorism, and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting
or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of such
acts will be held accountable.'
Introduction
The horrors of September 11, 2001 and the events that unfolded
that tragic day do not need to be recounted here. It was a terrible day
in history, especially painful for Americans and those who lost their
loved ones. Indeed, the terrorist attacks were an assault on human
rights and the entire world order. The clandestine al Qaeda terrorist
network, established and led by the notorious Osama bin Laden,
perhaps represents the most pernicious and underestimated threat to
international peace and security in the post-Cold War world.
International terrorism manages to survive and even flourish,
threatening to topple governments, destroy economies, and shatter
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1. G.A. Res. 56/1, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/56/49 (2001) [hereinafter Resolution 56/1].
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people's sense of security, all while working underground and out of
sight, apparently in private and alone.
But for all its secrecy, terrorists work within national borders and
often in cooperation with public officials or with the acquiescence of
political leaders. The September 11 attacks by al Qaeda are a grave
reminder that sometimes terrorists depend on public officials, such as
the Taliban regime, for freedom to work and protection from
prosecution. Although many international terrorists act alone
without state support and in defiance of authorities, state sponsorship
and support of terrorism is a reality. States encourage, organize,
tolerate, finance, and train private sub-national groups to commit
terrorist acts, and when the horror is done, states honor the
perpetrators and welcome them into their land.2
This note explores the symbiotic relationship between states and
private persons who commit crimes of international terrorism, and
analyzes the relevant customary norms of international law that may
serve as a legal device to hold states accountable in damages for state
sponsorship and support of international terrorism.3 Part I of this
note examines the historical development of customary and
conventional norms relating to international terrorism and its
definition. Part II describes the duties that states owe to each other in
preventing and punishing international terrorism under the law of
state responsibility for injuries to aliens. Various types of state
misconduct that give rise to state responsibility for terrorist activities
committed by private persons are discussed within a framework that
distinguishes between state sponsorship and support of terrorism.
Although legal remedies to acts of terrorism are not always
satisfactory, the potential value and positive externalities of recourse
to international law should not be disregarded.4 The international
2. See Kerry Ann Gurovitsch, Legal Obstacles to Combating International State-
Sponsored Terrorism, 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 159, 159 (1987); Brian M. Jenkins,
International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
AND WORLD SECURITY 13, at 26-27 (David Carlton & Carlo Schaerf eds., 1975).
3. There are primarily two methods for an injured state to bring a claim against
another state under the current international legal order. Most disputes are settled
within the political system through an exchange of diplomatic notes. Sometimes,
however, a state may bring a lawsuit before a tribunal empowered to adjudicate the
rights and obligations of the relevant state parties. Jurisdiction normally is based on
the consent of the parties.
4. The very notion of international law in a world dominated by sovereign
equals is problematic because there is no authoritative rule maker, rule enforcer, or
rule interpreter. This problem of authority, however, is not necessarily fatal to
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legal system is a peaceful, legitimate, and law-producing method to
hold states accountable for terrorist activities and compensate states
for injuries. It is also one effective way to build consensus among
states about the illegitimacy of terrorism and state responsibility for
the prevention and punishment of terrorism.
I. The Criminality of Terrorism under International Law
"Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end
there," President Bush pledged on September 20, 2001. "It will not
end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found,
stopped and defeated."'
The United Nations Security Council agreed with President Bush
on the urgent need to fight terrorism and cooperate in that endeavor
to successfully purge the world of international terrorists.' The
General Assembly, Security Council, and every major regional
organization, including the Arab League, agreed the September 11
hijackings and attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon were
acts of terrorism in violation of international law.'
Other than al Qaeda, however, it is unclear exactly who the
common enemy is in the war on terror. There are dozens of terrorist
organizations worldwide operating on international, regional, and
national scales.' Most of these organizations are dealt with on a state
international law. Even in domestic legal systems with an authority structure, the law
derives much of its force from its constituency, which may or may not regard the law
as legitimate and obligatory. International law then, which is based on state consent,
is a sociological enterprise, in which the law is found in those conventional and
customary practices of states regarded as legitimate and binding rules of conduct.
Indeed, the three primary sources of international law are treaties and conventions,
customary norms accepted as law, and general principles of law common to most
domestic legal systems. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945,
art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993.
5. President Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001), in U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Sept. 20, 2001, available at 2001 WL 21898403.
6. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1373 (2001).
7. The U.N. General Assembly condemned the attacks as illegal and criminal
acts of terrorism. Resolution 56/1, supra note 1. The Security Council condemned
the attacks "as a threat to international peace and security." U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess.,
4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES.1368 (2001). The Northern Atlantic Treaty
Organization, European Union, Organization of American States, Association of
South East Asian Nations, Organization of African Unity, and Arab League also
agreed that the hijacking of American passenger airliners by al Qaeda terrorists was
criminal. Colin Powell, A Long, Hard Campaign, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 2001, at 53.
8. See Neil King Jr. & Jim Vandehei, Defining 'Global Reach' May Prove
Elusive, WALL ST. J. EUR., Sept. 27, 2001, available at 2001 WL-WSJE 21838298.
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basis and the Bush Administration's strategy to focus on terrorist
groups of global reach is a recognition that it cannot go after every
alleged terrorist. But although government resources are scarce and
the best allocation of resources is a delicate policy judgment, it is
quite a different matter for states to disagree over what criminal acts
qualify as terrorism and which persons, groups, or states are regarded
as perpetrators of terrorism.
The word "terrorism" was first coined in connection with the
Jacobin "Reign of Terror," a period of the bloody French Revolution
in which the French state, under the control of Robespierre, executed
approximately 17,000 presumed enemies of the state.9 After World
War I, the League of Nations drafted the first penal instrument
making terrorism an international offense, entitled the Convention
for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism."0 This Convention,
which adopted a very broad definition of terrorism, never entered
into force because only one state, India, ratified the agreement."
Nevertheless, certain customary norms of international law relating to
the use of armed force, most notably the duty of states "to prevent
and suppress such subversive activity against foreign Governments as
assumes the form of armed hostile expeditions or attempts to commit
common crimes against life or property,"'2 implicitly proscribed at
least certain instances of terrorism.
After the Second World War, the international community
codified certain binding norms of international law in the United
Nations Charter. The architects of the United Nations, who were
intimately acquainted with the causes of armed conflict and the
consequences of war, declared that the purpose of the United Nations
was:
[t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal
of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression
or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
9. John F. Murphy, Defining International Terrorism: A Way Out of the
Quagmire, 19 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 13,14 (1989).
10. 19 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 23 (1938).
11. The Convention defines terrorism as "criminal acts directed against a State
and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular
persons, or a group of persons or the general public." Id.
12. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 292-293 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed.,
8th ed. 1955).
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international law, adjustment or settlement of international
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace
13
Although the Charter does not expressly mention terrorism,
Article II, section 4 seems to prohibit state support of international
terrorism. It orders all Member States to "refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 4
In 1970, the General Assembly approved the Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-Operation Among States, which made the Charter's implied
prohibition on state support of international terrorism express:
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating,
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in
another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its
territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the
acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of
force .... Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance,
incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed
towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or
interfere in civil strife in another State. 5
Unlike Article II, section 4, which only requires that states
refrain from the threat or use of force, the Declaration Concerning
Friendly Relations requires positive action on the part of the state so
as not to acquiesce in or tolerate terrorist activities originating from
within its territory. Unfortunately, it is not clear what legal status the
Declaration possesses under international law. A special committee
drafted the Declaration to be a restatement of seven fundamental
principles of international law and the General Assembly adopted it
by consensus.'" While resolutions passed by the General Assembly
are not binding on state parties, they are soft evidence of the opinio
juris of states, especially when passed with near unanimity and
repeatedly over time.
13. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
14. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
15. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970).
16. Richard B. Lillich & John M. Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries to
Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 217, 270-271 (1977).
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Although passed only once, some commentators regard the
Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations as an authoritative
interpretation of the U.N. Charter because of the drafting
committee's mandate to restate the fundamental principles of
international law. 7 Furthermore, there is a long-standing General
Assembly practice of passing resolutions that condemn both active
and passive state support of terrorism'8 and in recent years, the
Security Council stated that "all States shall [r]efrain from providing
any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved
in terrorist acts . . . ."'9 Professor Lillich, a widely respected publicist
on international terrorism and state responsibility," agrees that
customary international law expects states to prevent their territory
from being used by terrorists for the preparation or commission of
acts of terrorism against aliens within its territory or against the
territory of another state.2' Indeed, it is rarely asserted that state
acquiescence in or toleration of acts of international terrorism is
lawful; states are more inclined to deny that the state's action or
inaction rises to the level of state support or that the alleged act of
terror meets the legal definition of terrorism.
In fact, a single definition of terrorism is not found in either
customary or conventional international law. For the past thirty
years, efforts by the United Nations to draft a single broad definition
of terrorism acceptable to all states, such as that found in the
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, have
17. Id. at 271-272.
18. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 31-102, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 185-186,
U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976); G.A. Res. 34-145, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46,
at 244-245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980); G.A. Res. 38-130, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess.,
Supp. No. 47, at 266-267, U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1983); G.A. Res. 44-29, U.N. GAOR,
44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 301-303, U.N. Doe. A/44/49 (1989); G.A. Res. 46-51, U.N.
GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 283-285, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991); G.A. Res. 51-
210, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 346-348, U.N. Doe. A/51/49 (1996);
G.A. Res. 53-108, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 364-365, U.N. Doc.
A/53/49 (1998); G.A. Res. 56-160, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 358-359,
U.N. Doc. A/56/49 (2001) [hereinafter General Assembly Resolutions].
19. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doe. S/RES.1373 (2001); see
also U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4413th mtg. at 157-158, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1377 (2001);
U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4053rd mtg. at 157-1.58, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1269 (1999).
20. The writings of widely respected publicists, so long as they reflect the actual
status of the law rather than personal recommendations, are a subsidiary source of
international law. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 4, at 1060.
21. See I LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 127a (Robert Jennings &
Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996); Lillich, supra note 16, at 245, 261.
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failed.22 Conventional international law on terrorism is presently
limited to a relatively small number of widely accepted conventions
that proscribe particular types of terrorism, which likely reflect
customary norms of international law.23 The most common types of
terrorism covered by these conventions include crimes against the
safety of civil aviation and maritime navigation, the taking of
hostages, the use of nuclear and chemical weapons, and crimes
against internationally protected persons. 4
Terrorism, however, is not limited to these conventional
situations; and is more generally understood as involving the
deliberate use of violence against civilians with the intent to induce a
common or general danger, usually for political ends.25 Although this
definition of terrorism does not appear in any binding international
instruments, it provides a useful starting point for a discussion of
terrorism under customary international law. This definition does
not, however, regard attacks on non-civilians, such as the 2000 al
Qaeda attack on the U.S.S. Cole that killed seventeen Navy
personnel, as terrorist in nature. Instead, an attack on the military of
a state is judged according to international norms concerned with the
use of armed force. Although civilians are certainly the prototypical
targets of terrorism, the U.S. State Department also regards attacks
on non-combatants as terrorism.6 Under this broader definition, the
2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole is terrorism because the ship was
peacefully stationed off the coast of Yemen.
In any case, terrorism, as its name implies, is intended to
intimidate, frighten, or incite panic in the public.27  Unlike other
criminals, terrorists regard possible victims of an attack as fungible so
22. Rosalyn Higgins, The General International Law of Terrorism, in TERRORISM
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (Rosayln Higgins & Maurice Flory eds., 1997); see also
Murphy, supra note 9, at 15-18.
23. See Louis Rene Beres, On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA.
J. INT'L & COMp. L. 1, 1-2 (1994).
24. See Yonah Alexander, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats and
Responses, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 59, 92-94 (1999).
25. Murphy, supra note 9, at 14.
26. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2656f(d)(2) (2002).
27. Defining the relevant population for purposes of determining whether an act
of violence was tailored to terrorize the public is itself problematic. "The size of the
group affected will differ depending on the purpose and possibilities of the
perpetrators: from a whole nation ... to a restricted group such as the passengers
using a means of transportation that has become the object of unlawful seizure."
Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Definition of Terrorism, 19 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 39, 42
(1989).
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long as they are representative or symbolic of the larger public. Thus,
terrorists target diplomats, Olympic athletes, public transportation
systems, and other symbols of nations and governments.
International terrorism, and the fear that it engenders, is used as a
political and social tool to punish, gain concessions and publicity for a
cause, and to provoke disorder and retaliation.28
Even this definition of terrorism, however, is not complete.
Under customary international law, defining the perpetrators of
terrorism is problematic and controversial. As a factual matter,
private persons, organizations, and states are perpetrators of terrorist-
like activities, but the international community often draws legal
distinctions about the legitimacy of such activities based on the
identity of the actor. These distinctions lie at the very heart of the
war on terror and threaten to divide the international community.
Under customary international law, states are not perpetrators of
terrorism because terrorism is a penal offense and states are not
subjects of international criminal law.29  Nonetheless, General
Assembly resolutions that repeatedly condemn state undertaking and
support of terrorism implicitly acknowledge that states are involved
in terrorist activities.3" Authoritarian, totalitarian, and racist regimes
use terrorism as an instrument of power and domination over their
own people. Both non-democratic and democratic states engage in
terrorist-like military operations against foreign civilian populations,
such as the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and other
states sponsor and support extremist terrorist organizations fighting
foreign occupation.
Some scholars argue states should be subjects of international
criminal law.3' An international criminal court would enable any state
to charge another state for "certain flagrant harms" regarded as an
injury to "the entire international community," whereas the current
legal system based on the law of state responsibility limits standing to
the state injured in fact.2 Of course, states cannot be criminally
28. Jenkins, supra note 2, at 16-19.
29. Although states themselves are incapable of being held criminally liable for
acts of terrorism under the current international system, natural persons may be
prosecuted for their actions and their status as a public official or other agent of the
state does not relieve them of criminal responsibility. Skubiszewski, supra note 27, at
45.
30. See General Assembly Resolutions, supra note 18.
31. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 12, at 396.
32. Edward M. Wise, International Crimes and Domestic Criminal Law, 38
[Vol. 26:83
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prosecuted and punished in the same manner as natural persons or
corporate entities. There is no judiciary with criminal jurisdiction
over states33 and the punishment of states, unlike other legal creations
such as corporations, which are subject to dissolution, is necessarily
limited to the imposition of monetary penalties. Moreover, it may be
undesirable to impose criminal penalties on states because those
harmed most are likely to be working people with little or no
connection to the state's misconduct.34  Nevertheless, criminal
penalties for states may operate as a more effective deterrent than the
current legal system, which does not authorize punitive damages
against states for their participation in terrorist activities.
Under the law of state responsibility for injuries to aliens, states
are liable in delictual damages for any terrorist act attributable to the
state.35 The underlying cause of action is premised on the responsible
state's violation of the law of armed conflict, which imposes
limitations on the use of force or threats by states against foreign
civilian populations, or laws relating to the protection of human
rights, which establish minimum standards for the treatment of
people.36 Although injured states are compensated for their harm
under this system, unlike natural persons and non-state entities, states
are free from criminal punishment for their participation in terrorist
activities.
Whereas some scholars argue states should be subject to the
same criminal laws as persons, others argue that both states and
persons should have more, rather than less, freedom to engage in
terrorist activities when the cause for violence is just.37 They argue
that terrorism is sometimes the best available vehicle to achieve
change in a static domestic and international system in which
governments do not represent the ethnic and religious composition of
their people.
In 1972, the United States attempted to push through the Draft
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of
DEPAUL L. REV. 923, 929-930 (1989).
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. Skubiszewski, supra note 27, at 47.
36. Id. at 45; Higgins, supra note 22, at 15-16.
37. Thomas M. Franck & Scott C. Senecal, Porfiry's Proposition: Legitimacy and
Terrorism, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 195, 222 (1987); Wil D. Verwey, The
International Tehran Convention and National Liberation Movements, 75 AM. J. INT'L
L. 69, 74 (1981).
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International Terrorism, after the kidnapping and murder of eleven
Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games." This Convention,
which focused on the prevention and prosecution of acts of terrorism
committed by private persons, did not confront state support of
terrorism or even define terrorism. 3' Nonetheless, support for the
Convention collapsed under the charge by Arab states that it was
targeted against all national liberation movements." In the general
debate, a Libyan representative described the Convention as a
"'ploy... against the legitimate struggle of the people under the yoke
of colonialism and alien domination' and warned against the United
Nations becoming 'an instrument in local election campaigns and a
pawn of international propaganda based on falsehood and deceit.' 4.
The U.S. Representative, while conceding that the causes of terrorism
should be studied, replied: "'[w]e do not hesitate in our domestic law
to prohibit murder even though we have not eliminated all sources of
injustice or identified all the causes which lead men to commit violent
acts."'42
After the failure of the U.S. initiative, a resolution submitted by
Algeria condemning "terrorist acts by colonial, racist and alien
regimes" and upholding the legitimacy of the struggles of peoples
against such regimes, passed the General Assembly by a vote of 76 to
35, with 17 abstentions.43 The General Assembly, far from settling the
conflict, continues to speak with multiple voices up to the present
day, both condemning "the acts, methods and practices of terrorism
in all its forms and manifestations"4 and upholding "the right to self-
determination of peoples under colonial domination and foreign
occupation . . . ."' This unresolved tension is also present in the
38. John F. Murphy, United Nations Proposals on the Control and Repression of
Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 493, 496 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1975).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 502.
41. Id. at 499.
42. Id. at 499-500.
43. G.A. Res. 3034, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 119, U.N. Doc.
A/8730 (1972).
44. G.A. Res. 56-160, supra note 18, at 359.
45. G.A. Res. 56-141, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 326, U.N. Doc.
A/56/49 (2001); see also G.A. Res. 2787, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 82-
83, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 31-34, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39,
at 93-94, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976); G.A. Res. 35-35, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp.
No. 48, at 175-177, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980); G.A. Res. 38-17, U.N. GAOR, 38th
Sess., Supp. No. 47, at 185-187, U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1983); G.A. Res. 44-80, U.N.
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Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, which simultaneously
proscribes terrorism and upholds the right of peoples to self-
determination.
As a practical matter, deadlock between states regarding the use
of terrorism by national liberation movements may trigger the
application of the default rule of international law, which permits
everything in the absence of an express prohibition. Acts of terror
not falling into conventional international law fall into a lacuna in the
law, and consequently, their illegitimacy is uncertain. It would seem
that some terrorist acts, such as the destruction of the twin towers of
the World Trade Center, supposing it had not been accomplished
through the use of hijacked planes, which is itself specifically
proscribed by convention, run afoul of the U.N. Charter's prohibition
on armed attacks, whereas Palestinian suicide bombings are arguably
justified under the principle of self-determination.
The attacks of September 11, however, which are unprecedented
in the annals of terrorism, demonstrated the unpredictable and
limitless potential of terrorism to cause devastating injury and
mobilized major players in the international arena to an unequivocal
condemnation of terrorism. In his October 1 opening speech to the
General Assembly, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated:
I understand and accept the need for legal precision. But let me say
frankly that there is also a need for moral clarity. There can be no
acceptance of those who would seek to justify the deliberate taking
of innocent civilian life, regardless of cause or grievance. If there is
one universal principle that all people can agree on, surely it is
this.
48
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 203-204, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989); G.A. Res. 46-
88, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 157-158, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991);
G.A. Res. 51-84, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 226-227, U.N. Doc.
A/51/49 (1996); G.A. Res. 54-155, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 287-288,
U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (1999); G.A. Res. 55-85, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at
364, U.N. Doc. A/55/49 (2000).
46. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970). In fact, the Syrian delegate to U.N. proceedings on the Declaration
concerning Friendly Relations expressed his state's belief that the Declaration's
proscription on state support of terrorism does not apply to "Palestinian terrorist
raids into Israel supported by Arab states." Lillich, supra note 16, at 272.
47. The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. E) No. 4, at 166,
174-175 (Sept. 7).
48. See Michael J. Jordan, Terrorism's Slippery Definition Eludes UN Diplomats,
in THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 4, 2002, available at 2002 WL 6423921.
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Although the Secretary-General's speech falls far short of
offering an operational definition of terrorism capable of
distinguishing simple acts of violence from terrorism, his
condemnation of terrorist acts "regardless of cause or grievance" was
a ceremonially important event. It suggested that a just cause, such as
a national liberation movement, does not excuse the use of terrorist
means.
49
Six weeks later, on November 12, 2001, the Security Council
endorsed the Secretary-General's position and said for the first time
that the "acts, methods and practices of terrorism [are] criminal and
unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation ... ,,.. The Security
Council, however, did not refer specifically to national liberation
movements or define terrorism, which would have removed much
doubt as to its intentions, and also has not condemned Palestinian
suicide attacks on Israeli civilians . Moreover, similar language is
employed in General Assembly resolutions that purport to condemn
terrorism unequivocally, and yet, those resolutions are
counterbalanced by other resolutions reaffirming the right to self-
determination.
At this time, it is difficult to foresee the long-term impact of
September 11 on the definition of terrorism under international law.
Even if there is not good cause to believe the legal system has
resolved historical and cultural differences over the illegitimacy of
different acts of terror, there is hope that common international
interests in peace and security will play a more significant role in the
foreign relations of states than in the past. Historically many states
consider it in their best interest not to consent to antiterrorism
conventions that necessarily limit their sovereignty, thereby
49. For the writings of scholars who write that a just cause does not justify or
change the illegal character of a terrorist attack, see Louis Rene Beres, The Meaning
of Terrorism - Jurisprudential and Definitional Clarifications, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 239, 241-242 (1995); Skubiszewski, supra note 27, at 52; Verwey,
supra note 37, at 75.
50. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4413th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1377 (2001). For
a discussion of whether this resolution of the Security Council carries the force of
law, see infra Part II.B. at "State Support of Terrorism."
51. On September 24, 2002, the Security Council issued a resolution in which it
condemned "all terrorist attacks against any civilians." U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess.,
4614th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1435 (2002). However, while it specifically
mentioned two bombings committed by Israeli authorities, the resolution did not
expressly mention Palestinian suicide bombings nor did it define terrorism. Id.; see
also U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4503rd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1402 (2002); U.N.
SCOR, 57th Sess., 4489th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1397 (2002).
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constraining the government's democratic choices and making their
citizens accountable to an international court 2  In the wake of
September 11, these states, most notably the United States, will likely
re-evaluate their priorities and may ratify antiterrorism conventions
in order to obtain and maintain international support for an on-going
war on terror. International agreement on the criminality of
terrorism, or at least upon the identification of the common enemy, is
absolutely essential to undermining the mobility of terrorists so that
they may not find refuge or support in a sympathetic state.
II. State Involvement in and Responsibility for Terrorist
Activities Committed by Private Persons
The doctrine of sovereignty developed as a new theory of states
during the birth of the modern state in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. 3  During that time, nation-states began consolidating
feudalistic power and revolted against religious authority.54 Out of
the Reformation, the state emerged as the supreme and undivided
authority over its people and territory.5 Although sovereignty was
first envisioned as "a principle of internal order," it transformed "into
one of international anarchy."56 When the doctrine of sovereignty
was applied to the external relations of states, it became a vehicle for
unrestrained and irresponsible state conduct capable of producing a
perpetual state of war and conflict, in which sovereignty is absolute in
theory but non-existent in fact. 7 In purporting to make all states
supreme, sovereignty was used as a justification for states to engage in
any activity whatsoever even if its conduct harmed another state. 8
Over time, other customary norms or principles emerged as
limitations on absolute sovereignty that promote the peaceful co-
existence of states and protect the authority of the state over its
52. See Virginia Morris & M. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, Current
Development: The Work of the Sixth Committee at the Fifty-Third Session of the UN
General Assembly, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 722, 728 (1999); Thalif Deen, Politics: U.S. Shies
Away from U.N. Treaties Against Terrorism, INTER PRESS SERVICE ENG. NEWS WIRE,
Sept. 12, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4805236.
53. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS, ch. 1, § 2 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th
ed. 1963).
54. Id. ch. 1, § 1.
55. Id.
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domestic jurisdiction." Today, the law of state responsibility for
injuries to aliens, which imposes duties and responsibilities on states
to prevent and compensate states for certain injuries, imposes
significant limitations on state conduct. The most basic, if somewhat
circular, principle of state responsibility is that a state is not
absolutely liable for the actions of non-state entities, but is only
responsible for conduct attributable to the state.i ' In order to hold a
state liable in damages for terrorist activities committed by private
persons, it is necessary for the injured state to show the conduct of the
private persons is attributable to the state under customary or
conventional norms of international law.
The following two sub-sections of this note, which address state
sponsorship and state support of terrorism, discuss the circumstances
in which the activities of private persons are attributed to the state. It
is suggested that the terms "state sponsorship" and "state support"
should be used to refer to two qualitatively different kinds of state
involvement in terrorism. It is generally understood that state
sponsorship of terrorism is limited to situations where the state
planned, directed, and controlled terrorist operations and state
support of terrorism includes all other lesser forms of state
involvement.6 ' Governments, media, and other institutions, however,
often use these terms loosely as much for propagandistic purposes as
to reflect a legal judgment about a state's responsibility for an act of
terrorism. Several members of the Committee on Responses to State-
Sponsored Terrorism, formed by the American Society of
International Law in 1986, "expressed dissatisfaction with the terms
'state sponsorship' and 'state support' on the ground that these terms
lack precise legal content."62
59. See id. ch. 1, § 3. The notion that state sovereignty is actually increased
through the introduction of normative restraints on state action is somewhat
analogous to John Locke's construction of the social contract as a means to maximize
individual liberty by surrendering certain rights found in the state of nature, such as
the power to punish others for a crime, to the state. See MAURICE WILLIAM
CRANSTON, LOCKE: A BIOGRAPHY 210 (1985).
60. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-
Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001)
[hereinafter ILC Report]; CLYDE EAGLETON, RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 24 (1928); 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 165
(Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1948).
61. THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, NONVIOLENT RESPONSES
TO VIOLENCE-PRONE PROBLEMS: THE CASES OF DISPUTED MARITIME CLAIMS AND
STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM 19 (1991).
62. Id. at 18-19.
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Nonetheless, state sponsorship and state support of terrorism are
solidly entrenched in the discourse of terrorism and are powerful
expressions of state complicity, guilt, and participation in acts of
terror. As such, these terms serve an important political and legal
function, connecting states, which surreptitiously assist terrorists, to
their terrible crimes. The rest of this note attempts to define the
terms "state sponsorship" and "state support" in relation to well-
accepted and highly developed principles of state responsibility. This
approach to international terrorism should be perceived as more
legitimate and predictable than the current state-based approach.
Both terms should be used to describe state involvement in
terrorist acts committed by private persons.63  However, state
sponsorship is different from state support. The notion of state
sponsorship is analogous to two different customary norms found in
the law of state responsibility for injuries to aliens. Under the first
norm, the actions of private persons are attributed to the state when
the state controlled or directed the crime. The second norm
attributes otherwise private conduct to the state when the state
acknowledges and adopts the conduct as its own. State support of
terrorism refers to all other delictual misconduct of the state not
amounting to sponsorship. It is suggested that the state is responsible
for acts of international terrorism that it supports along a sliding scale
of state responsibility that takes into account the state's misconduct
and the causative nexus between the state's misconduct and the harm.
A. State Sponsorship of Terrorism
The International Law Commission ("ILC"), a body established
by the U.N. General Assembly to make recommendations for the
codification of customary international law, describes when conduct is
attributed to states in its Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts.'M Articles 8 and 11 codify the relevant
rules pertaining to state responsibility for terrorist acts committed by
private persons. Article 8 is the classic formulation of the de facto
agency principle; it reads: "[t]he conduct of a person or group of
persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if
63. The term "state terrorism" is probably a better label for acts of terrorism
committed by public officials or organs of the state. Some states, of course, contend
that state terrorism does not exist because by definition, terrorism is perpetrated only
by private persons.
64. ILC Report, supra note 60, at 44-45.
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the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of,
or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the
conduct., 65 Historically, the ILC has firmly insisted that in order to
meet this test "'it has to be effectively proved' [in each and every case]
that the person or persons 'had really been charged by the state
organs to carry out that specific act.'
' 66
Article 11, in contrast, does not require proof of a state's prior
knowledge, and instruction or control of a terrorist act in order to
attribute a private person's conduct to the state. Under this rule,
"conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding
articles shall nevertheless be considered an act of a State under
international law if and to the extent that the State acknowledges and
adopts the conduct in question as its own. 67 This rule differs from
the classic formulation of the de facto agency principle in that the
private person is not acting on behalf of the state at the time of the
act's commission, rather state responsibility is based on the state
identifying the conduct and either expressly or impliedly making the
conduct its own at some later date.66
In two different cases, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ")
applied and expanded on the tests found in Articles 8 and 11 to
determine whether a state was responsible for criminal and terrorist
activities committed by private persons. In the first case, entitled
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the ICJ held
that Iran was responsible for the taking of U.S. hostages by private
militants because the Iranian Government sanctioned and
perpetuated the hostage crisis. In November 1979, thousands of
student militants overran the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took about
ninety people hostage in protest of the Shah's admission to the
United States for cancer treatment after his escape from the Iranian
Revolution. When the militants entered the Embassy compound,
Iranian security forces responsible for guarding the building left
without a fight." The Iranian government refused to take action
against the militants and "numerous Iranian authorities, including
65. Id. at 45.
66. Luigi Condorelli, The Imputability to States of Acts of International Terrorism,
19 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 233, 239 (1990).
67. ILC Report, supra note 60, at 45.
68. Id. at 122.
69. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3, $ 74 (May 24).
70. Id. 57.
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religious, judicial, executive, police, and broadcasting authorities"
expressed approval of the hostage taking.7' The Ayattolah Khomeini,
the Muslim leader of Iran, publicly stated: "The noble Iranian nation
will not give permission for the release of the rest of them.
Therefore, the rest of them will be under arrest until the American
Government acts according to the wish of the nation.
2
The ICJ concluded that, although the militants initially acted on
their own,73 Iran's approval and perpetuation of the hostage crisis for
more than a year transformed the acts of the private militants into
acts of the state." Under the ILC's draft articles, this decision is
probably closer to the situation envisaged in Article 11 than Article 8,
and may have even motivated the drafting of Article 11, added after
the Tehran decision. The ICJ treated the Ayattolah's statement, in
particular, as an acknowledgement and express adoption of the
hostage taking. Unlike the classic Article 11 situation, however, the
hostage crisis was not over when the Iranian state approved and
adopted the actions of the private militants; instead, Iran continued
the hostage crisis for a total of more than fourteen months under the
authority of the state. In this respect, the Tehran case resembles an
Article 8 situation, in which the state directed or controlled the
militants, although it may be more accurate to say Iran declined to
exercise control over the militants, a situation that does not fall within
the express language of Article 8.
Six years later in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua, the ICJ ruled that the United States was not
responsible for the rebel activities of Nicaraguan Contras because
evidence that the contras were controlled and dependent on the
United States was insufficient to establish that the United States
directed their each and every act.75 The United States, in the midst of
the Cold War, was concerned about communism spreading from
Nicaragua, where the U.S.-backed dictator, Anastasio Somoza, was
71. Id. [71.
72. Id. 973.
73. "No suggestion has been made that the militants, when they executed their
attack on the Embassy, had any form of official status as recognized 'agents' or
organs of the Iranian State. Their conduct in mounting the attack, overrunning the
Embassy and seizing its inmates as hostages cannot, therefore, be regarded as
imputable to that State on that basis." Id. $1 58.
74. Id.
75. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, $1 109 (June 27).
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ousted in a popular revolution to El Salvador and other states in the
region. Under the leadership of the Reagan Administration, the
United States organized, trained, armed, and financed the contras,
many of whom were former Somoza National Guards, in their
opposition to the new communist government of Nicaragua. 6 The
contras engaged in attacks against the Nicaraguan state and brutally
murdered, raped, mutilated, and terrorized Nicaraguan civilians."
For years, the United States provided crucial support to the contras
and the eruption of the Iran-Contra Scandal later revealed that the
Central Intelligence Agency funded the contras by illegally selling
weapons to Iran at inflated prices.
The ICJ ruled that U.S. support for the contras infringed on
Nicaragua's territorial sovereignty in contravention of international
law,9 but concluded the evidence did not demonstrate the United
States "actually exercised such a degree of control in all fields as to
justify treating the contras as acting on its behalf."79  In order to
attribute the actions of the contras to the United States, the ICJ
required proof in each instance that operations launched by the
contras "reflected strategy and tactics solely devised by the United
States."""
Whereas the judgment in the Tehran case was met with general
approval and approbation, the Nicaragua decision was criticized for
its "painstaking examination" of specific acts.81 The ICJ's act-by-act
76. Id.
77. Report Accuses Contras of Murder, Mutilations, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 20, 1985, at
5, available at 1986 WL 2647862. Critics of the U.S. government charged the United
States with supporting terrorism and deviating from its own State Department
definition of terrorism when in its national interest. Despite reports of terrorism
perpetrated by contra rebels, President Reagan was a staunch supporter of the
contras and described them as freedom fighters, even likening them to the Founding
Fathers of the United States. See George Skelton, President Reiterates Firm Backing
for Contras, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1985, at 5, available at 1.985 WL 2206644.
78. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 75, 11 108.
79. Id. 109.
80. Id.
81. "In several instances the Court in the Nicaragua case determined generally
that there was insufficient evidence to prove a point. There was no 'direct evidence
of the size and nature of mines' laid in the Nicaraguan ports. There was no evidence
of U.S. involvement in the planning or execution of certain attacks on Nicaraguan
installations.... Where the Court is proceeding by a relatively painstaking
examination of what has, and what has not, been denied or proved, it can readily be
seen that the lack of specificity common to many political and diplomatic statements
will result in an inadequacy of proof or persuasion." Keith Highet, Evidence, The
Court, and the Nicaragua Case, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 40-41 (1987); see also Francis V.
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approach to de facto agency, also sketched out in Article 8, requires
proof of state authorization of each and every act carried out by
private persons before the conduct is attributed to the state. This
approach risks mistaking the trees for the forest so as a result states
can get away with sponsoring terrorists so long as they do not direct
specific acts. Furthermore, it is often unduly difficult to collect
evidence on state direction or control of terrorists, who are employed
and work in circumstances of great secrecy and concealment. For
these reasons, it seems inequitable to absolve the United States of
responsibility for the crimes of contra rebels, especially given the
ICJ's concession that U.S. support was crucial to their activities.82
An alternative rationale for the Nicaragua decision, largely
overlooked in scholarly literature, but firmly rooted in the historically
important debate over the criminality of terrorism, is an expansive
reading of the right to self-determination and a permissive attitude
toward revolutionary activities. It makes some logical sense to
conclude the contra rebels, in fact, were not acting on behalf of the
U.S. government, regardless of the extent of U.S. support, but rather
fighting for their own liberation. Judge Ago, in his separate opinion,
alluded to this argument when he stressed that the conflict in
Nicaragua arose from the seeds of civil strife and internal unrest. 3
Unlike in the Tehran case, in which Iran allowed a hostage crisis to
occur under its watch, the criminal acts of contra rebels took place in
Nicaragua, far outside of U.S. territory.
This reasoning, however, wrongly presupposes the contras
cannot act on behalf of multiple parties at the same time, especially
where the interests of the contras and the U.S. government overlap.
It also gives states carte blanche freedom to support any group
involved in a struggle for self-determination and yet avoid
responsibility for the actions of those groups. Ultimately, a legal
system that respects sovereign borders and takes state sponsored
terrorism seriously must take a hard stance against state support of
terrorist tactics in revolutionary activities. Even more importantly,
the international community must establish a test of de facto agency
that balances faithfulness to legal principles of state responsibility and
Boyle, Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), 81 AM. J.
INT'L L. 86 (1987); Claire Finkelstein, Changing Notions of State Agency in
International Law: The Case of Paul Touvier, 30 TEx. INT'L L.J. 261, 274-275 (1995).
82. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 75, 110.
83. Id. 10 (separate opinion of Judge Ago).
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sensitivity to the unique evidentiary problems associated with
demonstrating state control or direction of terrorist activities.
B. State Support of Terrorism
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ adopted an all or nothing
approach to state responsibility. In the absence of sufficient proof to
demonstrate the contras were de facto agents of the U.S. government,
the United States escaped any responsibility for the contras' actions.
This approach created a simple measure of damages because only two
bipolar options existed - either the United States was or was not
responsible for the actions of the contras. The problem with this
approach is its tendency to oversimplify and distort real life situations
in an effort to classify conduct as either public or private. Professors
Mark Gibney, Katarina Tomasevski, and Jens Vedsted-Hansen
explain:
The ICJ decision in Nicaragua is especially objectionable because
the U.S. Government's actions in supporting the contras was
ultimately treated under the law as being indistinguishable from
countries that had absolutely no connection with the contras
whatsoever (Kenya, say). But this 'either-or' approach to
transnational state responsibility wildly misses much of what is
actually taking place in the world.84
Although the principle of de facto agency enunciated in the
Nicaragua decision is certainly an important and useful device in the
law of state responsibility, the all or nothing approach that it
engenders lacks the necessary flexibility in some contexts to
distinguish between shades of state responsibility. The notion of state
support of terrorism is intended to remedy this problem. It is used to
describe all other state involvement in terrorist acts not amounting to
sponsorship, which can be placed along a continuum "beginning with
active involvement and descending to benign neglect."" Under this
scheme, a state that supports terrorism, in dereliction of its
international duties, may be held responsible in full or in part for the
terrorist act along a sliding scale of state responsibility, which takes
into account the egregiousness of the state's misconduct and the
nexus between the state's conduct and the terrorist act.
84. Mark Gibney et al., Transnational State Responsibility for Violations of
Human Rights, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 267,287 (1999).
85. Lillich, supra note 16, at 308; see also Kenneth W. Abbott, Economic
Sanctions and International Terrorism, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 293 (1994).
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This sliding scale of state responsibility is a more nuanced and
sensible approach to state responsibility than the all or nothing
approach inherent in the Nicaragua decision. A sliding scale of state
responsibility ultimately requires a case-by-case analysis to determine
the state's responsibility for terrorist acts supported by the state, but
committed by private persons. It is possible, however, to identify
several important variables that should be considered. State
responsibility must first be founded on a violation of international law
by the state. There is no per se or absolute theory of liability that
makes states responsible for terrorist acts committed by private
persons.86 There are, however, three different situations in which
state responsibility attaches: first, where a state actively supports
international terrorism;87 second, where a state breaches a duty to
prevent international terrorism;' and third, where a state breaches a
duty to prosecute or extradite those persons who committed acts of
international terrorism.89 As a general rule, a state that knowingly
supports terrorists in bad faith is more culpable than a state that
negligently, but inadvertently supports terrorism and a pattern or
practice of supporting terrorism also calls for greater state
responsibility. States are also expected to exercise a higher degree of
due diligence in protecting diplomats and other persons with special
international status.' The causative nexus between the state's
conduct and the private act is also important. As a general
proposition, states that support terrorism before or during the
commission of the crime, as in the Nicaragua case by organizing,
training, or arming terrorists, are more responsible for the criminal
act than those states that support terrorists after the fact by providing
asylum. Sometimes, however, a foreseeable consequence of
providing asylum to terrorists is the commission of terrorist acts in the
future for which they may be held responsible.9'
State responsibility for terrorist activities actively supported by
the state logically follows from the state's complicity in the offense. 2
More problematic is a state's responsibility for acts of terrorism that it
failed to prevent. A state is not expected to prevent every act of
86. Lillich, supra note 16, at 225-226.
87. Id. at 236-237.
88. Id. at 230-231, 261.
89. Id. at 306.
90. OPPENHEIM, supra note 60, § 165a; Lillich, supra note 16, at 232.
91. See Lillich, supra note 16, at 285.
92. Id. at 236-237.
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international terrorism that originates from within its territory. 3
What is expected is that states exercise due diligence in the
performance of their international obligations so as to take all
reasonable measures under the circumstances to protect the rights
and securities of other states.9' In the Tehran case, the ICJ explained
that due diligence is breached when the state was "aware of the need
for action on their part" and "failed to use the means which were at
their disposal" to prevent the harm.95
The ICJ employed this same two-part test of due diligence in the
Corfu Channel case.96 In this case, the United Kingdom brought suit
against Albania for damage sustained to two British warships by
mines moored in Albanian territorial waters.97 In upholding the
British claim, the ICJ decided Albania's failure to warn the British
ships of imminent danger was a breach of international law.9"
Although the ICJ stated proof of a state's awareness of a threat
cannot be presumed and must "leave no room for reasonable
doubt,"' 9 it concluded the mines could not have been laid "without
the knowledge [or connivance] of the Albanian Government."'00 In
framing the breach as a failure to warn, rather than a failure to
remove the mines, the ICJ chose to focus on that conduct which was
most easily within the power of the Albanian Government.
The Tehran case and Corfu Channel case demonstrate that due
diligence, or what conduct is reasonably expected of states in order to
protect the rights of other states, is defined as a function of the state's
knowledge about a threat and its power to prevent the harm. "The
most difficult aspect of applying traditional state responsibility norms
to terrorist situations is that the latter rarely conform to the neat
prior-notice pattern. Surprise attacks are endemic to terrorism."''
93. OPPENHEIM, supra note 21, § 156.
94. Lillich, supra note 16, at 245-246; Jeffrey Allan McCredie, Note, The
Responsibility of States for Private Acts of International Terrorism, 1 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 69, 86 (1985). At a minimum, the duty of due diligence demands that
states act in good faith and non-negligently in the performance of their international
obligations. OPPENHEIM, supra note 93, § 156.
95. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), supra
note 69, % 68.
96. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1.949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
97. Id. at 12.
98. Id. at 22-23.
99. Id. at 18.
100. Id. at 22.
101. Lillich, supra note 16, at 249.
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For this reason, constructive knowledge, such as when a number of
terrorist acts have occurred in the past in the same area, may be a
desirable surrogate for actual knowledge in the terrorism context.'0
°
In addition to customary norms of international law that require
states to refrain from actively supporting terrorism and require states
to exercise due diligence to prevent acts of international terrorism, in
certain situations, state responsibility for terrorist activities may also
be predicated on a denial of justice for the state's failure to prosecute
or extradite terrorists in good faith. Although customary
international law does not require the prosecution or extradition of
international terrorists in all circumstances, states are expected to
prosecute terrorists who commit crimes against aliens within the
territory of that state.0 3 This duty to prosecute requires that states
afford aliens with the same access to the domestic judicial system as
enjoyed by its citizens for crimes that occur within its jurisdiction."°
A state fulfills its duty to prosecute when it in good faith attempts to
apprehend, prosecute, and adequately punish the terrorists.' 5 The
state is not expected to suspend its internal laws in order to ensure
that terrorists are brought to justice."° Constitutional and statutory
safeguards that limit the municipal power of the state, such as those
regulating searches and seizures, self-incrimination, and the state's
burden of proof, may frustrate the goals of international law, but do
not violate its substance.
In Janes v. United Mexican States, the majority and dissent of the
General Claims Commission grappled with the notion of a sliding
scale of state responsibility and the proper conditions in which to
attribute private conduct to the state for a denial of justice. In Janes,
a Mexican miner murdered a U.S. citizen working in Mexico as a
mine superintendent. 7 Although several eye-witnesses to the crime
102. Id. at 246.
103. Id. at 305-306; OPPENHEIM, supra note 21, § 165.
104. See BRIERLY, supra note 53, at 286.
105. Id. at 287. Most Latin-American states contend that a court only needs to
hear a case in order to fulfill its duty to prosecute. The prevailing rule, however, is
that "[t]here are many possible ways in which a court may fall below the standard
fairly to be demanded of a civilized state without literally closing its doors. Such acts
cannot be exhaustively enumerated, but corruption, threats, unwarrantable delay,
flagrant abuse of judicial procedures, a judgment dictated by the executive, or so
manifestly unjust that no court which was both competent and honest could have
given it, are instances." Id. at 286-287.
106. Id. at 287.
107. Janes v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 82, 17, 19
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identified the murderer to Mexican authorities, the police did almost
nothing to investigate or apprehend the suspect as required by
international law.
108
The majority concluded that attribution of the murder to Mexico
was inappropriate because Mexico was not responsible for the
murder itself, only its failure to punish the culprit after the fact."'° In
other words, the state was not responsible for the crime because the
state, which was not accused of inciting or otherwise assisting the
murderer before or during the criminal act, played no causative role
in the murder. The majority stated: "[elven if the non-punishment
were conceived as some kind of approval-which in the
Commission's view is doubtful-still approving of a crime has never
been deemed identical with being an accomplice to that crime .... ,""0
The ILC also takes this position in its commentary to Article 11; it
explains that a state's verbal approval or endorsement of a crime "in
some general sense" does not make the state responsible for the
crime.'
Nonetheless, the ILC does make an exception when the state
acknowledged and adopted the act, even though there is no causative
nexus between the state's conduct and the criminal act."2 The dissent
invoked this rule, codified in Article 11 of the ILC's draft articles,
when he wrote the responsibility to "compensate the claimant for the
injuries flowing from the wrongful act of the individual.., rests upon
the offending State because by its failure to act it condones and
ratifies the wrongful act, thereby making the act its own.""' 3  The
majority conceded that there was a basis in international law to
attribute an unpunished criminal act to a state for its failure to
prosecute:
At times international awards have held that, if a State shows
serious lack of diligence in apprehending and/or punishing culprits,
its liability is a derivative liability, assuming the character of some
kind of complicity with the perpetrator himself and rendering the
State responsible for the very consequences of the individual's
(1925).
108. Id.
109. Id. T 22.
110. Id. 9T 20.
111. ILC Report, supra note 60, at 121.
112. Id. at 45.
113. Janes, supra note 107, at 90 (Commissioner Nielson in separate statement
regarding damages).
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misdemeanor.
1 4
The fundamental disagreement between the majority and
dissent, therefore, appears to lie in whether the facts of the case
supported the inference that Mexico acknowledged and adopted the
murder as its own. Although Mexico did not expressly adopt the
murder as in the Tehran case, the dissent apparently implied an
adoption from the Mexican police's failure to take simple steps to
arrest and try the suspect."' The dissent may have also taken judicial
notice of the social conditions in Mexico at the time, which led police
to be antagonistic toward U.S. citizens perceived as exploiting
Mexican labor. The majority, in contrast, did not infer an adoption of
the murder from Mexico's failure to prosecute; and at least according
to the ILC's commentary to Article 11, which distinguishes "mere
support" from adoption, the majority has the stronger argument.
1 6
Although there was a failure to prosecute, there was no evidence the
Mexican police or any other governmental agencies ever treated the
murder as an act of the state, since the state did not publicly honor
the murderer or confer him with governmental authority.
If the majority's analysis is correct and the Janes Case was not an
Article 11 situation, then Mexico's conduct was more analogous to
state support than sponsorship. The majority went on to describe
how it assessed Mexico's responsibility for its failure to prosecute:
As to the measure of such a damage caused by the delinquency of a
Government, the nonpunishment [sic], it may be readily granted
that its computation is more difficult and uncertain than that of the
damage caused by the killing itself.... Not only the individual grief
of the claimants should be taken into account, but a reasonable and
substantial redress should be made for the mistrust and lack of
safety, resulting from the Government's attitude.'
7
The majority awarded $12,OOOUS to the United States on behalf
of the claimants;' 8 and in so doing, claimed not to hold Mexico
responsible for the actual murder. Nonetheless, the majority did not
explain why Mexico was responsible for the "individual grief of the
claimants" if the state was not responsible for the murder, which was
surely the predominant cause of the grief suffered by the victim's
114. Id. 19.
115. See id. 3.
116. ILC Report, supra note 60, at 121.
117. Janes, supra note 107, at 98, $ 25.
118. Id. 1 27.
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family. Moreover, the claimants never alleged any damages based on
"mistrust" or "lack of safety."19 Given the intangible and speculative
nature of damages for a failure to prosecute,2" and courts' greater
familiarity and experience with the assignment of damages for
wrongful death, it is unlikely the murder itself did not influence or
anchor the majority's decision-making.
Despite the vociferous disagreement between the majority and
dissent over the proper measure of Mexico's responsibility, both
ultimately agreed on the exact dollar amount that Mexico owed to the
claimants. 2' One explanation for the majority and dissent's
agreement on the damage award of $12,OOOUS is that the entire
Commission shared a common understanding of Mexico's grossly
negligent conduct and callous indifference for the murder of a U.S.
citizen on Mexican soil. The majority exhibited its preference for a
sliding scale of state responsibility when it stated:
One among the advantages of severing the Government's
derelection [sic] of duty from the individual's crime is in that it
grants an opportunity to take into account several shades of denial
of justice, more serious ones and lighter ones (no prosecution at all;
prosecution and release; prosecution and -light punishment;
prosecution, punishment and pardon); whereas the old system
operates automatically and allows for the numerous forms of such a
denial one amount only, that of full and total reparation."'
Thus, the majority thought that it was preferable to adopt a rule
that does not automatically attribute a private person's criminal act to
the state for a failure to prosecute because it allows courts to fashion
remedies on a case-by-case basis according to the egregiousness of the
state's conduct, rather than simply holding a state responsible for a
wrong committed by a private person every time the state fails to live
up to its international duties. Of course, it could be asserted the Janes
case uses the same all or nothing approach used in the Nicaragua
case, in which state responsibility is based wholly and exclusively on
the state's misconduct, which may itself vary along a sliding scale but
in which the state escapes all responsibility for the private crime. This
argument, however, makes a distinction without a difference because
119. 1 MARJORIE WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 44-45 (1937).
120. Id.
121. Janes, supra note 107, at 98, 27 (Commissioner Nielson in separate
statement regarding damages).
122. Id. % 25.
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the effect is the same-the state is held responsible in damages
somewhere along a sliding scale. Moreover, the state's misconduct
cannot be understood in isolation; it is inextricably connected to the
private act.
Unfortunately, the rule of the Janes case, which holds states
responsible for a denial of justice, is of, limited value in the
international terrorism context. While states are obligated to
prosecute terrorist activities that occur within its territory against
aliens, there is no corresponding duty under customary international
law to prosecute terrorists who commit acts of terrorism in another
state's territory.12 The customary right of asylum permits states to
harbor terrorists who attack the territory of another state, including al
Qaeda terrorists hiding out in Afghanistan."' Moreover, even where
an extradition treaty exists that requires states to prosecute or
extradite persons who unlawfully harm the territory of another state,
the political offense exception significantly erodes the duty to
prosecute.125 Although this exception originally came into existence
to protect persons from discriminatory persecution, it is an expansive
right that permits states to refuse prosecution or extradition of any
person that it determines is charged with a political offense. 26 As a
result, this exception is well suited to justify the granting of asylum to
international terrorists acting out of political motives, especially those
involved in a national liberation movement.'27
In November 2001, however, the Security Council took a
position that indicates the right of asylum may no longer be
applicable to terrorist attacks. It stated that "all States shall deny safe
haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist
acts.... "28  On its face, this rule does not distinguish between
terrorist activities based on the location of the crime. However, the
Council's authority to proscribe the practice of granting asylum to
terrorists is questionable and untested. This resolution represents the
Council's first attempt to use its powers under the U.N. Charter to
123. Lillich, supra note 16, at 298.
124. Id.
125. See JOHN F. MURPHY, THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: SUMMARY REPORT OF AN
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 2 (1980).
126. JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 258-260 (1996).
127. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 60, § 334; Lillich, supra note 16, at 300.
128. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1373 (2001); see
also U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4413th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1377 (2001).
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create binding international law based on a generic threat to
international peace and security, a far cry from its other resolutions,
which are limited to regulation of specific inter-state conflicts.
129
Nonetheless, the Council is acting in accordance with a long legacy of
antiterrorism conventions, which require that states either themselves
prosecute, or in the alternative, extradite international terrorists
within their territory.
30
In fact, some scholars posit that for certain narrowly defined
crimes set out in the most widely accepted antiterrorism conventions,
such as aircraft hijacking and crimes against internationally protected
persons, customary international law imposes a duty to prosecute or
extradite terrorists regardless of where the crime occurred. 3' They
argue that these antiterrorism conventions reflect norms of state
behavior and thus, the duty to prosecute or extradite included in
these conventions is also a reflection of customary international law.'
3 2
More likely, however, is that these conventions represent customary
norms of international law only to the extent that they define the
crime of terrorism. Professor Lillich expressed his view, prior to the
recent Security Council resolution, that "it is doubtful whether a state
incurs liability - at least in the absence of its being a party to an
applicable convention - if it merely offers safe-haven to terrorists who
have committed their acts in another state."'33
One of the most important and beneficial developments in
international law that may arise out of September 11 is a
deterioration of the right of asylum. The harboring of terrorists is no
less detrimental to world peace and security than the incitement or
toleration of terrorist activities, despite its happening after the
commission of the crime. Many terrorists depend on the promise of a
safe harbor, from which they may freely live and even plan future
terrorist attacks. Viewed as another form of state support, the
practice of granting asylum to terrorists should be treated as a
violation of international law.
129. Jim Wurst, U.N. Debates Definition of Terrorism, INTER PRESS SERV., Oct. 4,
2001, available at 2001 WL 4805541.
130. Murphy, supra note 9, at 18-19.
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Conclusion
Decades from now, historians and scholars will be in a position to
document how September 11 changed the way states think about
terrorism, its definition, and the responsibility of states in managing
their own territory for the collective security. In the wake of
September 11, the Security Council has taken steps toward an
unqualified condemnation of terrorism irrespective of cause or
motivation and has condemned the general state practice of granting
asylum to international terrorists.
This note suggests that states should use the international legal
system to hold states accountable in damages for state sponsorship
and support of terrorist activities committed by private persons. The
bringing of claims through diplomatic channels and before judicial
tribunals educated in international law will not only increase state
accountability for international terrorism, but will also create a much
needed opportunity to change and clarify international norms relating
to terrorism and state responsibility. Customary norms of
international law should evolve in response to the changing needs of
the international community. As the threat of international terrorism
increases, states may wish to impose criminal sanctions on states for
the use of terrorism, create enhanced duties of due diligence for the
prevention and punishment of terrorism, and relax evidentiary
standards for attributing terrorist acts to the state. There is certainly
an urgent need in the international community to hold states
responsible for the violation of international law and accountable for
their participation in terrorist activities.
In furtherance of this objective, and in order to demonstrate the
utility of legal analysis of state involvement in international terrorism,
the Taliban regime's responsibility for the September 11 terrorist
attacks is assessed in this conclusion. In October 2001, the British
Government released a dossier of evidence summarizing intelligence
that linked the September 11 attacks to bin Laden, his Afghanistan-
based al Qaeda network, and the Taliban regime. 34 This evidence is
examined here in order to determine if the law of state responsibility
supports an inference that the Taliban regime was responsible for the
September 11 al Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States.
Based on the British dossier, any claim that the Taliban
134. Christine Middap, Dossier Presents Case on Bin Laden, HERALD SUN
(MELBOURNE), Oct. 5, 2001, at 32.
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sponsored the attacks is attenuated at best. There is little indication
that either of the two tests set out in Articles 8 and 11 of the ILC's
draft articles on state responsibility are met. The evidence does not
suggest the Taliban controlled al Qaeda or directed its activities; nor
is there proof of the Taliban providing arms, money, or other material
support to al Qaeda.'3 Given these facts, this case is probably weaker
than the case for U.S. control over Nicaraguan contras, who were
organized, trained, armed, and financed by the U.S. government,
although al Qaeda did use Afghanistan as a base for operations.
Moreover, the Taliban never acknowledged and adopted the terrorist
acts as its own as in the Tehran case; and under Janes, tacit approval
of the attacks does not amount to adoption.
A much stronger case can be made that the Taliban are
responsible for the attacks, somewhere along a sliding scale of state
responsibility, based on its support of al Qaeda. The Taliban
provided bin Laden and his al Qaeda network with a sanctuary in
Afghanistan where terrorist attacks were planned without state
intervention. 3 6 On this basis, if the Taliban knew about a terrorist
threat to the United States and possessed power to prevent the harm,
then the Taliban's failure to take action against the al Qaeda network
was a breach of its international duties. However, the Corfu Channel
case seems to require actual knowledge of a specific threat in order to
hold the state responsible for the harm. There is no evidence the
Taliban possessed actual knowledge of the September 11 attacks in
advance;... however such a narrow construction of the knowledge
requirement in this situation would seem to pervert the objectives of
international law. The Taliban knew bin Laden and al Qaeda
planned and trained for terrorist activities in Afghanistan 3 ' and its
lack of actual knowledge about the September 11 attacks could be
attributed to its own negligent policing. Moreover, the Taliban never
claimed it was unable to police terrorist activities and even declined
an offer of assistance from the U.S. government prior to September




138. Since 1993, al Qaeda has claimed credit for numerous attacks, including the
murder of more than 260 people in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and aboard the U.S.S.
Cole. Moreover, "[i]n June 2001 ... the U.S. warned the Taliban it would hold the
regime responsible for attacks against U.S. citizens by terrorists in Afghanistan." Id.
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reasonably strong basis in international law to conclude the Taliban
failed to exercise due diligence to prevent acts of international
terrorism.
In contrast, the Taliban regime's refusal to prosecute or extradite
bin Laden and his cooperatives was probably consistent with
international law. Although the refusal to extradite the masterminds
behind the worst terrorist attack in history is the most damning
evidence of the Taliban's bad faith and tacit approval of the attacks,
according to customary norms of international law, the Taliban was
probably permitted to grant asylum to terrorists who harmed aliens in
another state. An argument can certainly be made that there is an
emerging norm that requires the prosecution or extradition of all
international terrorists. Even if this rule is retroactively adopted,
however, the United States Government did not follow customary
extradition procedures. 4 It never formally requested the extradition
of bin Laden or any other suspect and never provided criminal
evidence of a suspect's guilt to Afghanistan. 4'
Taliban support of al Qaeda was certainly egregious and in
violation of customary norms of international law. Its history of state
tolerance of, and acquiescence in, international terrorism enabled the
al Qaeda network to commit terrible terrorist acts that are clearly
proscribed by international law. Admittedly, Taliban support for al
Qaeda was primarily passive, but its misconduct was knowing and
grossly negligent. Its refusal to extradite, although probably legal,
demonstrated extreme bad faith and was evidence of the state's seal-
of-approval, even though it probably does not amount to an adoption.
Based on these facts, principles of state responsibility support the
inference that the Taliban was responsible in substantial part for the
September 11 attacks.142 In this manner, the application of the law of
state responsibility to terrorist activities may prove to be one effective
weapon among many in combating state sponsorship and support of
140. On September 20, in a televised address to a joint session of the U.S.
Congress, President Bush demanded that the Taliban extradite Osama bin Laden and
his cooperatives to the United States for trial. He stated that "[t]he Taliban must act,
and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share their fate."
See President Bush, supra note 5.
141. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-
Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83, 87 (2002).
142. For another article that reaches a similar conclusion regarding Taliban
responsibility for the September 11 attacks, see Robert K. Goldman, Certain Legal
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